In his celebrated article of 1933,1 Professor Cavers first propounded the "rule-selective" approach to choice of law in contrast to the traditional approach which he then labeled 'jurisdiction-selecting" and later, 2 for the sake of clearness and broader acceptability, "state-selecting." He pointed out that some trace of the "rule-selective" approach is found also within the domain of the traditional approach. This observation may have been meant to soothe apprehensions on the part of "conservatives" by showing that what was proposed was not unheard of but rather the blossoming into full flower of old and random insights. The remark shows the balanced and scholarly temper of the author who did not want, as most innovators understandably do, to emphasize the originality and importance of the proposal. He was, however, fully aware that, with his "academic" idea, he was urging "at least the reconsideration, perhaps the abandonment, of all the current rules.
law and that it is not suitable for legislative techniques. Typically, a court decision deals with the individual case whose elements and features are presented to the court or can be elicited by it as needed for understanding and deciding. In the conflicts case, especially where it is up to the parties to present it as one by raising the question of the applicability of a foreign provision, the court has at least an inkling of what the result will be when one rather than the other of the available laws is applied. The choice between them may well be influenced (and at first Cavers seemed to intimate that it should be so influenced, nay determined) by the foreknowledge of these different results. 6 In my opinion, under Cavers' original approach to conflict of laws, choiceof-law "rules," i.e. conceptual formulations of precepts endowed with a considerable degree of generality and abstraction, are hardly possible. Legislation, be it internal (statutes, codes) or international (treaties, conventions), usually consists of rules. Under Cavers' distinctive approach, one can only have "pre-4. Significantly, Professor Deelen, of the University of Tilburg, gave a sketch of modern views about private international law the title "Savigny's Blindfold." J.E.J. TH. DEELEN, DE BLINDDOEK VAN VON SAVIGNY (1967) . The jurisdiction-selecting approach indeed goes back to the conception of private international law held by that leading European jurist of the early nineteenth century who advocated a set of rules of universal validity fixing (from above, one might say) the sphere of application of the different legal systems on the basis of connecting factors thought proper for the different types of legal relationships. The most recent contribution to the discussion of basic reform proposals concerning conflict of laws, EGON LORENZ, ZUR STRUKTUR DES INTERNATIONALEN PRiVATRECHTS (1977) , starts, as a matter of course, with a critical analysis of the view of Savigny. 6. In the words of Cavers, "the court is not idly choosing a law; it is determining a controversy. How can it choose wisely without considering how that choice will affect the controversy?" Cavers, supra note 1, at 189. "Perspicacity," he says (at 192), is peculiarly essential for dealing with complex issues such as those raised by interstate or international cases, and yet courts blind themselves to the content of the law to which the rule or principle of selection points and to the result which that law may work in the case before them, under the mistaken assumption that here their task is to "seek an appropriate jurisdiction, not an appropriate substantive rule." Id. at 178. [Vol. 41: No only courts can follow his advice. An indirect proof of this feature of Cavers' system is that the "avenues of escape" from the traditional "entanglement," which he finds to have been tried from time to time by the courts and suggested by some American authors, also appear to have been attempted in identical or similar terms in legal orders where the choice of law is basically statutory. However, these attempts relate either to special situations and take a very special form, or they relate to a problem of conflict of laws that cannot properly be solved by legislation.
Cavers mentions, first of all, conflicts rules "couched in terms of a result regarded as proper in litigation of a given sort." ' By way of illustration he mentions the choice of usury laws: under a trend apparent in American conflicts doctrine and practice, contracts to which the objection of usury was made were carried out if they were valid under "the law of any jurisdiction to which the transaction was materially related." The learned author also recalls i t the suggestion made by Professor Lorenzen that this solution in favor of the lex validitatis (to use Professor Ehrenzweig's terminology) be extended whenever the "intrinsic validity" of a contract is under scrutiny.
A similar solution is accepted for formalities in most legal systems. For instance, under art. 26(1) of the Preliminary Dispositions to the Italian Civil Code, "The form of inter vivos acts and of acts of last will is governed by the law of the place in which the act is completed or by the law which governs the substance of the act, or by the national law of the transferor or by the national law of the contracting parties, if it is common." Under the generally accepted construction, this means that, in Italian private international law, the 7. Cavers is perfectly right, in my opinion, when he maintains that "[n]othing in the proposed approach is inconsistent with continuance of the doctrine of stare decisis, properly conceived." He also realized from the start, with utter clarity, that "the creation and fruitful employment of rules of this sort must be attended by the development of standards for the evaluation of the facts which they render significant." Id. at 196-97. Later on, he did try his hand at formulating some such "rules of preference." D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 133-203 (1965 8. "We were very fact-minded in the 30's," Cavers delightfully concedes (D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 7, at 133-34), "and liked even our principles narrow." 9. By a flight of fancy, one can imagine a law-maker so shrewd and "herculean" as to be capable-and willing-of setting out in detail written provisions covering the whole conceivable gamut of combinations of conflictual situations and substantive rules mixtures, each hypothesis accompanied by the final choice. Yet this rulemaking process would have to be continuously resumed because mutations of the substantive rules are always impending and their character and import can hardly be foreseen with any precision. A skeptical appraisal of the "potentialities of legislation in choice of law" is expressed in Cavers, Legtslative Choice of Law: Some European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340 (1971) . With a deceptive mildness of tone, Cavers concludes that "the persistent reluctance of American conflicts scholars to advocate legislative solutions, at least for interstate conflicts, draws some support from the state of the art abroad." Id. at 359-60.
10. Cavers, supra note 1, at 182. 11. Id. at 182-83.
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question of the formal validity of a contract is not settled merely by a reference to a legal system chosen on account of a certain connecting factor (e.g., that of the place of execution); rather, a plurality of references is envisaged.
Reference is precisely to the lex loci contractus celebrati, the lex patriae communis of the contracting parties, and the law governing the contract in general. Among these legal systems a further, final choice is to be made by comparing their requirements for the formal validity of a contract of that type under the principle of preference ut res magis valeat quam pereat.' l Here the choice-of-law process is split into two stages: in the first one, the relevant legal systems are indicated (lex loci contractus celebrati, lex patriae communis, lex contractus) without
any regard to what their respective substantive rules require for the formal validity of the contract; in the second and conclusive one, these substantive rules are considered and compared, to see whether the contract was executed properly at least from the viewpoint of one of them.
A similar choice within a choice-one being "jurisdiction-selective" in character, the other "rule and result-selective"-is contemplated whenever two or more connecting factors are considered at the same time and the final decision is made to depend upon the comparative merits (in relation to a certain substantive "value") of the substantive rules of the legal systems identified by the connecting factors. Thus, when the "interests" of a minor or an adoptee are taken to be paramount, the personal law of the parent or the adopter, or, on the contrary, that of the minor or the adoptee, shall prevail in determining the legal effects of minority or adoption, according to whether the provisions of the former or of the latter law are more favorable to the child. 165, 173-202 (1977) . See also Van Hecke, Principes el methodes de solutim des conflits de lois, 126 RECUEIL DES COURs 409, 478-79 (1969 I), where still other instances are briefly considered. The author concludes that "le souci du contenu de la regle declar~e applicable n'est donc pas entierement etranger au droit international priv6 tel qu'il se pratique aujourd'hui. Mais ce souci se manifeste sous la forme d'un rattachement alternatif et ainsi la securit6 juridique que procure la regle de rattachement est-elle sauvegardee. Cavers' technique also is "two-phased," because necessarily, one starts by establishing which legal systems are to be looked into in the search for the substantive rule appropriate to the case. 1 4 Cavers does not propose or expect, for instance, that an American court consult the national law (lex patriae) of a party, 1 5 even in matters of capacity or family relations; t n such a connecting factor as nationality is immaterial from the point of view of American positive law and legal tradition in the field of "horizontal" conflict of laws.' 7 This means that certain contacts are relevant, and others are not; such relevance or irrelevance depending also, I would suppose, on the subject matter.
After criticizing the traditional conception of the function of connecting factors by the felicitous simile of the "coin, which, when inserted in the doctrinal slot machine, produces the appropriate jurisdiction," provided the coin fits the slot,'" Cavers indeed opposes to it' 9 that, "if a law is to be chosen with , 744-50 (1972 The "new Cavers" (Addendum 1972, supra note 1, at 172) seems to advocate the development ("by a rational judge or legislature") of a set of preferences that would lead, subject matter by subject matter, to "the more protective law." It appears to me that such a step requires a decision about which is the "interest" worthier of protection: in the words of Cavers, "Under what circumstances is it fair to the parties that one be advantaged and the other disadvantaged?"
14. This is a point that von Mehren & Trautman properly stress by pointing out that first of all the choice-of-law process requires the determination of the relevant connecting factors, leading to the "concerned jurisdictions" and their relevant and possibly conflicting rules of law from which, either through a choice or a combination, the court is going to draw the terms for the decision of the case. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76, 102-105 (1965) .
Even when it is not stated which are the connections to be taken into account, but one speaks generally of "substantial connections" (see the suggestion by Lorenzen concerning contracts noted by Cavers, supra note 11), not all conceivable connections are meant: in the broadest sense, the reference will be to those connecting factors that are at least the subject of debate in "literary circles," and, in a narrower, more plausible sense, to those factors that are used by the body of conflicts rules of the forum.
15. A supporter of the conception of private international law rules as "unilateral" such as Sohn, New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems, 55 HARV. L. REv. 978 (1942) , would do so whenever the forum is not interested and a foreign legal system puts forward its own rules for application on the basis of such a connection. Id. at 995-96. In Italy, the theory was advocated by my lamented colleague ROLANDO some consideration of the result it effects in a given litigation, then the contact should itself be significant in relation to that result." I take this to mean that the contact's final significance depends on the content of the provisions of the legal system to which it leads: if these provisions are appropriate, they apply (and the contact, therefore, is effective); if they are not appropriate, the contact will be discarded and another one leading to appropriate rules will prevail. In any case, the idea of a conflict of laws implies that at least one foreign legal system, besides the lexfori, comes into consideration at the start and a foreign legal system comes into view for conflict-of-laws purposes through a connecting factor.
As an instance of peeping from under the blindfold, Cavers also mentioned the fact that, usually, the "intention of the parties" plays a role in determining the law applicable to contracts; 20 he argues that "the parties themselves will probably have appraised the consequences of an application of the law intended to the controversy in question." Years ago I pointed out, however, that the way the "autonomy of the parties" works is uncertain precisely on a point of importance in the present context. 2 1 If the reference by the contracting parties to a given law amounts to a definite, open-eyed choice of the solution envisioned by that law for the situation contemplated, which apparently is Cavers' interpretation, then its provisions ought to be applied as they stood at the time of the choice; yet it is usually accepted 22 that, even in the case of a choice by the parties, the applicable rules are those effective at the time for application (practically, the time of suit).
According to Cavers, 23 another instance of an examination of "the competing rules of law as a means of determining the appropriate law to be applied" is the discarding of a foreign rule of law when it is found to be procedural in character. I am not so sure. Under the jurisdiction-selecting approach, and by legefori characterization, what counts is the procedural character of a rule of the forum law, not that of the foreign law. Should a matter be attached to procedure within the conceptual framework of the lex fori, the provision of the latter shall apply to it, any foreign provision being immaterial; on the contrary, should a matter be substantive under the lexfori, the provision applicable to it under the legal system selected by the choice-of-law rules of the forum shall apply, even if the matter is "procedural in character" from the point of view of its own legal system. 
SPECIAL SUBSTANTIVE RULES
A type of situation where the solution of a conflict of laws is presented as being dependent on the content of substantive rules of the legal systems concerned is offered, strangely enough, by a staunch supporter of the traditional technique, Professor Morelli. In his renowned outline of Italian conflict of laws, 24 the learned author maintains that the establishment of an adoption depends, according to the Italian choice-of-law rules, 25 on the leges patriae of adopter and adoptee: "One must leave out of consideration, however," he adds, "those requirements that the lex patriae of the adoptee has laid down only in order to protect the adopter's family and, on the other hand, those requirements that under the lex patriae of the adopter aim at protecting the freedom of the adoptee or of his family to prevent the adoption." This seems to mean that the scope of application of the lex patriae of the adoptee and the lex patriae of the adopter, respectively, is not completely determined beforehand, so to speak, by the forum stating that they both apply to the requirements for adoption; but in part at least, is made dependent upon the sort of requirements that those laws contemplate and on the purpose or policy of the provisions. But perhaps this conclusion is based on a misconception caused by the elliptical form of presentation of Morelli's opinion. What he has in mind, probably, is a choice-of-law rule of this sort: the national law of the adoptee "governs" the requirements for adoption that, in light of the forum's legal conceptions, impinge on the interests of the adoptee or of his family, while the national law of the adopter "governs" the requirements for adoption touching upon the interests of the adopter or of his family. Under this formula, it is clear from the start (and, of course, one starts at the forum) not only which are the applicable laws, but also to what sort of questions they respectively apply. A situation in which, under the jurisdiction-selective approach, "a frank discarding of the blindfold" takes place is, according to Cavers, 2 7 the discarding of the conflict-of-laws rule "when the foreign law it selects dictates a result repugnant to the public policy of the forum." He is perfectly right, but the situation is peculiar. Here even in a legal order endowed with a system of statutory rules on choice of law, the problem is not and cannot be properly 70, 77 (1950) . In Morelli's opinion, art. 20(2), which deals expressly with adoption and submits it (more precisely, the "relationships between adopting parent and adopted child") to the national law of the adopter at the time of adoption, covers only the effects of adoption, so that for the conflicts rule on its coming into being one must look elsewhere, and precisely at art. 17(1).
26. 1 may add that, under the interpretation given by Morelli, the requirements of both leges patriae must be satisfied for the creation of an adoption when interests of both sides of the relationship or community interests are concerned.
27. Cavers, supra note 1, at 185. Correctly, Cavers stresses the negative character of the public policy "exception" 2 9--or "limitation" (these being the terms used in Continental literature to distinguish the intervention of "ordre public international" from that of choice-of-law rules). It implies, the learned author remarks, 30 "no disavowal of the choice-of-law rule, which is preserved for use when the results it produces do not run counter to local standards of justice and policy," but unfortunately it "dispenses with the necessity for close analysis, for an affirmative appraisal of the situation upon which judgment must be passed."" Thirty years ago, commenting upon Cavers' essay, I remarked 3 2 thatapart from the serious doubts one may entertain whether, in view of its very special task of checking the end product of the choice-of-law rules, public policy is a rule of choice of law-nothing can be inferred from the public policy principle as to the way conflicts rules ought to be fashioned and ought to function, or, better, as to the way a conflict of laws ought to be resolved. One may add that, in the jurisdiction-selecting perspective, "ordre public international" comes into play when the applicable law as well as the applicable rule of the applicable law has been found and the question arises whether the rule deserves to be applied in foro. When this last problem is faced (and it is faced by the court), the blindfold will have already fallen. The substantive rule is in full view. Public policy considerations, on the other hand, may come into play even before the choice-of-law process has begun 33 and thus, in a jurisdictionselecting system, before any blindfolding because the lex fori has mandatory 28. Here, too, court decisions can in fact harden into precedents or some sort of "jurisprudence constante" (See JACQUES MAURY, L'iVICTION DE LA LOI NORMALEMENTE COMPETENTE: L'ORDRE PUBLIC ET LA FRAUDE A LA LOI 119-120 (1952) ), but with results less sure and less stable than usual; results, that is, which can be overturned, more easily than is generally the case, as a reflex of a shift in State interests or social mores.
29. Cavers, supra note 1, at 186, n.30: "the doctrine of public policy ... is negative in its operation."
30. Id. at 183. It may be pointed out that even under the "rule-selecting approach" the disavowal of a connecting factor when it leads to an inappropriate solution of the point in issue does not prevent its effectiveness when, on the contrary, it leads to a satisfactory decision.
31. Id. at 184. 32. De Nova, supra note 21, at 139. 33. Cavers, supra note 1, at 183, n.20, did not miss that "resort is often had to the public policy doctrine without a determination of the choice-of-law problem at issue."
On the connection between public policy considerations and the public policy exception, on the one hand, and the so-called "rules of necessary application," on the other, see the latest statement by Sperduti, Les 
